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Case No. 20050996-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Mark Allen Gordon,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of a controlled substance
in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2005), and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free
zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(a) (West
2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Was the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for possessing
cocaine and paraphernalia (Altoids tin) where the contraband was found in the
cushion where defendant was sitting, defendant made furtive gestures after the
officer activated his overhead lights, and in the face of a prior claim that he did not
know what was in the tin, defendant denied possessing "crack cocaine"?

Standard of Review. When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the
evidence, this Court "review[s] the record to see if the clear weight of the evidence,
not including demeanor and credibility, is contrary to the verdict/7

State v.

Goodman, 763 P.2d 786,787 (Utah 1988). The conviction will not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,192-93 (Utah 1987); Utah R. Civ.
P. 52(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and
possession of drug paraphernalia, but the text of those offenses is not determinative
of the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Summary of Proceedings
Defendant was charged by information with possession of cocaine in a drugfree zone, a second degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drugfree zone, a class A misdemeanor. R. 2-1, 21-20. After holding a preliminary
hearing, a magistrate bound defendant over to stand trial on both counts. R. 24-23,
78. Defendant waived a jury trial and the case was tried before the Honorable
Claudia Laycock. R. 49,60-56. The trial court found defendant guilty of both counts
as charged. R. 59; R. 79:145-51.
After receiving a presentence investigation report, the trial court sentenced
defendant to an indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in prison for the cocaine
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conviction and 365 days in jail for the paraphernalia conviction. R. 68-66, 81. The
court suspended the sentence, placed defendant on supervised probation, and
ordered that defendant serve 270 days in jail. R. 68-66, 81. Defendant timely
appealed. R. 70-69.
S u m m a r y of Facts
While on routine patrol on the night of July 9, 2005, Officer William Crook
stopped at a red traffic light behind a Chevrolet Celebrity. R. 79:40,47. Two men,
including the driver, were seated in the front seat of the car, and two men were
seated in the backseat. R. 79: 43. Officer Crook ran a computer check on the car,
revealing an expired registration and an arrest warrant for Eric Wahlberg—the
registered owner of the car—for drug possession. R. 79: 40-41, 43, 58. After the
traffic light turned green, Officer Crook activated his overhead wig-wag lights and
turned on his spotlight to illuminate the inside of the car. R. 79: 40-41,59. The car
pulled over less than 400 feet of a public parking lot— a drug free zone—and Officer
Crook radioed for backup. See R. 79: 56-57, 72-73, 82-83.
During the three to five seconds it took the car to pull over, defendant—who
was sitting in the backseat directly behind the driver—made what Officer Crook
described as "furtive movements/' R. 79: 41-43, 59. "[H]e turned slightly to his
right towards the center of the vehicle, his head turned, .. . [he] kind of ducked
down, as if he was [sic] looking down/' and "ma[de] movements as though he was
[sic] hiding something/ 7 R. 79: 41-42, 99. Officer Crook did not observe any other
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occupants make furtive movements. R. 79: 60. By the time Officer Crook walked u p
to the car, defendant was facing forward with his hands in his lap. R. 79: 43, 60.
After reviewing the driver's identification and confirming his identity as Eric
Wahlberg, Officer Crook arrested him on the outstanding warrant. See R. 79: 73,83.
By this time, Officer Orlando Ruiz had arrived as backup. R. 79: 82-83. The officers
handcuffed Wahlberg and placed him in the police cruiser. R. 79: 73, 83. The
passengers— who all appeared inebriated —were asked to exit the car so that the
officers could search the car incident to arrest. R. 79:43,51,73,83,86-88. Officer Jeff
Bailey, who had just arrived, stood with the passengers near the police cruiser as
Officers Crook and Ruiz searched Wahlberg's car. R. 79: 43, 50-51, 61, 73, 79, 83.
Officer Crook found an Altoids tin "in the backseat [cushion], in the exact location
where [he] watched [defendant] turn." R. 79: 44-46, 50, 61, 88-92. Officer Crook
opened the tin and found two small baggies containing crack cocaine. R. 79:44-47,
50-51, 70, 83; State Exh. #4. The officers discovered no other contraband in the car.
R. 79: 97-98.
Officer Crook confronted defendant about the drugs, but did not tell him
what kind of drugs were found in the tin, nor did he show him the drugs or
otherwise expose them to his view. R. 79: 53-55, 64. Defendant denied any
knowledge of the tin or its contents. R. 79: 53. Officer Crook then advised
defendant that he was under arrest for possession of a controlled substance,
handcuffed him, and read him his Miranda rights. R. 79:53,85,110. Wahlberg's car
was released to one of the two remaining passengers, neither of whom was arrested.
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R. 79: 54,100. Officer Crook then transported defendant and Wahlberg to the Utah
County Jail. R. 79: 54, 85.
On the way to jail, defendant continued to deny possession of the drugs,
contending that Wahlberg had previously sat in the backseat. R. 79: 62-64, 111. He
asked whether marijuana, methamphetamine, or cocaine was found in the tin, but
Officer Crook did not respond to his queries. R. 79:113,124. Defendant became
increasingly upset, spewing a tirade of profanities. R. 79:124. Finally, Officer Crook
turned up the radio volume in the back to drown out his screaming. R. 79:118,124.
At some point during the booking process, defendant was taken to a holding
cell near where Officer Crook was finishing his police report. R. 79: 54,112. Upon
reaching the cell, defendant proclaimed to Officer Crook that "it wasn't his crack
cocaine in the car." R. 79: 54,122. Aware of defendant's prior claim that he did not
know the identity of the drugs in the tin, Officer Crook responded, "Look, I never
pointed out what was in the container. There's no way you could have known what
was in the container." R. 79:55. Defendant immediately quieted. R. 79:55,113-14.l
After defendant was jailed, the three officers returned to the police station,
where Officer Crook booked the tin and drugs into evidence. R. 79: 56. Police

1

Officers Ruiz and Bailey both testified at trial that they themselves did not
learn the identity of the drugs until they arrived at the police station, after defendant
was transported to the jail. R. 79: 65, 78-79, 84-85. Defendant also testified that
police did not tip him off to the identity of the drugs on the night of his arrest, either
through word or action. R. 79:113-14.
5

attempted to lift fingerprints from the tin, but a fingerprint analysis found "no latent
impressions of comparable value/ 7 R. 79: 67; Def. Exh. #5.
Defendant's Trial Testimony. At trial, defendant acknowledged seeing the
Altoids tin on the dashboard of the car, but continued to deny any knowledge of
what was in the tin. R. 79:103,113-14,119-20. He denied making any reference to
"crack cocaine" at the jail and claimed that he did not learn that the tin contained
cocaine until his first appearance in court. R. 79:114. Defendant also attempted to
explain the furtive movements to which Officer Crook testified. He asserted that he
took off a cap and placed it on his knee when the officer activated his overhead
lights. R. 79:109. Officer Crook later testified in rebuttal that he did not observe
defendant remove a hat. R. 79: 121. Defendant also attempted to explain away
Officer Ruiz's testimony that he had bloodshot eyes, smelled heavily of alcohol, and
appeared intoxicated. See R. 79: 87-88. Defendant denied that he was intoxicated
that evening. R. 79:116. He acknowledged that he purchased a pack of beer, but
admitted to drinking only one beer. R. 79:101-03,108,115. He explained that his
eyes may have been bloodshot because he had spent a sleepless night at jail the
night before on a charge of public intoxication. R. 79:101-03,108,115-16.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he
constructively possessed the contraband. This claim fails. Defendant's close
proximity to the drugs, his furtive movements after the officer activated his
overhead lights, and his jailhouse reference to "crack cocaine/' in the face of a prior
claim that he did not know what was in the tin, demonstrated that defendant was
more than an innocent bystander.

It established a sufficient nexus between

defendant and the contraband to permit the inference that defendant had both the
power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drugs. Defendant's
convictions, therefore, were not against the clear weight of the evidence and should
be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED A SUFFICIENT NEXUS BETWEEN
DEFENDANT AND THE CONTRABAND TO PERMIT A FINDING
OF CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION
Defendant contends that his presence in the vehicle where the drugs and
paraphernalia were found was insufficient to establish his possession of those items.
Aplt. Brf. at 12-18.

The evidence, however, which consisted of more than

defendant's mere presence in the car, was sufficient to sustain defendant's
convictions.
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, [this Court]
must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is 'against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.'" State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87 (Utah 1988)
(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987)); accord State v. Gordon, 2004
UT 2, | 5, 84 P.3d 1167. As explained in Walker, this standard is no different than
the "clearly erroneous" standard applied to other factual determinations made by
trial courts. Walker, 743 P.2d at 192-93; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (stating that a trial
court's factual findings "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous").
Under the clearly erroneous standard, the appellate court "'does not consider
and weigh the evidence de novo'" or otherwise retry the case. Walker, 743 P.2d at
193 (quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971)). Rather, it
"accord[s] deference to the trial court's ability and opportunity to evaluate
credibility and demeanor." Goodman, 763 P.2d at 787. Reversal is only appropriate
8

"if the clear weight of the evidence, not including demeanor and credibility, is
contrary to the verdict/' Id. In this case, the evidence was sufficient to support the
trial court's verdict.
Possession of a controlled substance or drug paraphernalia may be proved by
showing that the defendant had either "actual possession" or "constructive
possession" of the contraband. See State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, % 31,122 P.3d 639.
Actual possession occurs when the contraband is found on the defendant's person
or is otherwise under his or her direct control. See State v. Carter, 696 N. W.2d 31,38
(Iowa 2005) (holding that "[a]ctual possession occurs when the controlled substance
is found on the defendant's person"); State v. Matthews, 484 P.2d 942, 943 (Wash.
App. 1971) (holding that" [a]ctual possession is proved when the drugs are found to
be in the actual, physical custody of the person charged with possession"). Because
the contraband in this case was not found on defendant's person, the State was
required to prove that defendant had constructive possession of the drugs and
paraphernalia found in the car. See id.
To prove constructive possession, the State must introduce evidence
establishing "'a sufficient nexus between the accused and the [contraband] to permit
an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise
dominion and control over the [contraband].'" Workman, 2005 UT 66, % 31 (quoting
State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316,319 (Utah 1985)). In other words, "[t]here must be some
action, some word, or some conduct that links the individual to the narcotics and
indicates that he had some stake in them, some power over them." Rivas v. United
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States, 783 A.2d 125,130 (D.C. 2001). Simply stated, "[t]here must be something to
prove that the individual was not merely an innocent bystander." Id.
Whether a defendant had a sufficient nexus to infer constructive possession is
"a highly fact-sensitive determination," State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 14,985 R2d
911, which "depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case," Fox, 709 P.2d
at 319.

In making that determination, courts may consider such factors as

"ownership a n d / o r occupancy of the .. . vehicle where the drugs were found,
presence of defendant at the time drugs were found, defendant's proximity to the
drugs, previous drug use, incriminating statements or behavior, [and] presence of
drugs in a specific area where the defendant had control." Workman, 2005 UT 66, f
32. However, this list of factors is not to be treated as "a checklist of things that
must be present if the law's requirements are to be met." Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 15.
The listed factors are not "universally pertinent" and the list is not "exhaustive." Id.
at Iff 14-15; accord Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 32.
As explained in Layman, "[t]he final legal test is the most generally-worded
one," i.e., whether the facts and circumstances establish "a sufficient nexus between
the defendant and the drugs or paraphernalia to permit a factual inference that the
defendant had the power and the intent to exercise control over the drugs or
paraphernalia." Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 15. The State introduced ample evidence in
this case to establish such a nexus.
Defendant rests much of his argument on the fact that the drugs were found
in Eric Wahlberg's car and that Wahlberg had an outstanding drug warrant. Aplt.
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Brf. at 16-18. While these factors would tend to support an inference that Wahlberg
possessed the drugs, they are insufficient to negate the stronger inference that
defendant constructively possessed the drugs.
Although defendant did not own the car where the contraband was found
and was not the driver, he was one of three passengers in the vehicle. R. 79:41-42.
Defendant's "'mere presence . . . in an automobile in which illicit drugs are found
does not, without more, constitute sufficient proof of his possession" 7 of the
contraband.

State v. Solas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting

Annotation, Conviction of Possession of Illicit Drugs Found in Automobile of Which
Defendant Was Not Sole Occupant, 57 A.L.R.3d 1319, 1326 (1974)).

Defendant's

conviction, however, did not rest merely on his presence in Wahlberg's car. There
was more.
Close Proximity to Drugs. Defendant was sitting in the backseat on the same
side where the drugs were found. R. 79: 42, 44-45. Although the other backseat
passenger had the ability to access the drugs, defendant was closest to the drugs,
and therefore, of all the occupants in the car, he had the most ready access to the
drugs. See Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 32 (concluding that "defendant's proximity to
the drugs" is a relevant consideration in determining constructive possession); see
also Carter, 696 N.W.2d at 39 (concluding that finding contraband "on the same side
of the car seat as the accused or immediately next to him" is a factor supporting
constructive possession).
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Furtive Gestures. Defendant also made "furtive movements" in the direction
of the drugs almost immediately after Officer Crook activated his overhead lights.
R. 79:41-43,59. Defendant "turnfed] towards the spot where the drugs were [later]
located77 by police, turned his head and "kind of ducked down,77 and "ma[de]
movements as though he [were] hiding something.77 R. 79: 41-42, 99. Contrary to
defendant's claim, Aplt. Brf. at 15, such furtive gestures are strongly indicative of an
intent to exercise dominion and control over the objects located in that area. See
United States v. Flenoid, 718 F.2d 867,868 (8th Or. 1983) (holding "testimony that the
defendant may have placed something in the spot where the police later found the
weapon can support a finding of possession77); United States v. Gutierrez, 995 F.2d
169,171 (9th Cir. 1993) (same, quoting Flenoid); see also United States v. Bowen, 437
F.3d 1009, 1016 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that a passenger's furtive movements
supported a finding of constructive possession); Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563,
574 (Ind. 2006) (recognizing that "furtive gestures" support a finding of constructive
possession); Williams v. United States, 884 A.2d 587, 604 (D.C. 2005) (holding that
defendant's repeated furtive gestures in the location where the firearm was found
"provided more than a sufficient basis upon which a reasonable juror could infer
beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] both knew of the gun and intended to
conceal it77); Carter, 696 N.W.2d at 39 (recognizing "suspicious activity by the
accused" as a factor supporting a finding of constructive possession).
Defendant argues, however, that the other backseat passenger was also in
close proximity to the drugs, implying that he too had ready access to the

12

contraband. See Aplt. Brt. a I 16-17. This may be true, but unlike defendant, that
passenger was never seen making furtive movements, nor was any other occupant
of the car. See R. 79: 60

I )efendant's "furtive movements in contrast to the

passenger's lack of such movements would further s u p p o r t . . . an inference" of
defendant's constructive possession. Carter, 696 N.W.2d at 41; accord State v. Herrera,
2002 UT App 55U, \ 3 (recognizing that finding of constructive possession of the
drugs and paraphernalia was supported in part by the fact that "the occupants in
the front seat of the car were not observed making any furtive movements")
(Addendum A).
"Crack Cocaine." Perhaps most damning, defendant inadvertently exposed his
deceit to police when he told Officer Crook at the jail that it was not his "crack
cocaine" that was found in the car. R. 79: 54,122. As defendant admitted at trial,
police did not tell him what kind of drugs were found in the car, nor was he ever
given the opportunity to see the drugs after police discovered them. R. 79:54-55,6465, 78-79, 84-85,113-14. Defendant disputes making the comment, but complains
that even if he had, it merely establishes his knowledge of the drugs and is
insufficient to establish intent to exercise dominion and control over the drugs.
Aplt. Brf. at 18. That statement, however, evidences more than just knowledge. His
deceit on this point, exposed by his statement at the jail, suggests not only
knowledge, but a guilty conscience that he was connected 1o tl c dru^s. See
Workman, 2005 UT 66, % 34 & n.2. His deceit was strong evidence that defendant
"was not merely an innocent bystander." Rivas, 783 A.2d at 130.
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Finally, defendant argues that the trial court's finding of constructive
possession fails to "preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence" because it
ignores, among other things, that the four people in the car "all traded places part
way through the journey" and that defendant "denied having any knowledge or
association with the drugs." Aplt. Brf. at 16,18. This argument misconstrues the
"reasonable hypothesis" rule.
"'[T]he mere existence of conflicting evidence... does not warrant reversal'"
under the "reasonable hypothesis" rule. State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 695 (Utah
App. 1995) (quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991)), cert, denied, 913
P.2d 749 (Utah 1996). The rule simply requires that the conviction "be based upon
what the [trier of fact] regards as substantial and credible evidence." State v. John,
586 P.2d 410,412 (Utah 1978); accord Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 695 (holding that the rule
"simply 'insur[es] that there is sufficient competent evidence as to each element of
the charge to enable a [trier of fact] to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant committed the crime'"). Where the factfinder rejects certain testimony,
an alternate reasonable hypothesis based on that testimony does not prevent the
factfinder from concluding that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 695. Such was the case here. See R. 149 (trial judge stating that
"[i]t is clear to me that the defendant's version of the events attempts to dovetail
very nicely into the officer's versions of the events, but I find that the testimony is
self-serving and not believable").
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In sum, defendant's presence in t he car, next to where the drugs and
paraphernalia were found, together with his furtive gestures in the direction of the
drugs, and his reference to "crack cocaine" at the jail, established a "sufficient nexus
between [him] and the [contraband] to permit an inference that [he] had both the
power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the [contraband]/"
Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 31 (citation omitted). The conviction, therefore, is not
"'against the clear weight of the evidence/" nor can it be said with "'a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been m a d e / " Goodman, 763 P.2d at 786-87
(citation omitted).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions.
Respectfully submitted October 11,2006.
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General

jfemrey S. Gray
'Assistant Attorney
Counsel for Appellee
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—00O00—

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Daniel Herrera,
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20000819-CA
FILED
February 22, 2002
|2002UTApp55

Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of methamphetamine, enhanced to a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i),(d) & (4)(a)-(b) (Supp.
2000), and possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1998), asserting that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find he
had constructive possession of the illegal items. We affirm.
When reviewing a jury verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, this court views the
'"evidence and the reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom . . .
in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted.1"
State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d
1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)).
Because the methamphetamine and paraphernalia were not found on defendant's
person, but in the backseat area of a vehicle where defendant was sitting alone, it must be
established that defendant had constructive possession of the drugs and paraphernalia.
Constructive possession can be found when:

"[T]here [is] a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug [or
paraphernalia] to permit an inference that the accused had both power and the
intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug [or paraphernalia]."
State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79,113, 985 P.2d 911 (quoting State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319
(Utah 1985)). "[T]he determination that someone has constructive possession of dmgs is a
factual determination which turns on the particular circumstances of the case." Fox, 709 P.2d
at 319. Defendant's "mere occupancy of a portion of the premises where the drug[s were]
found cannot, without more, support a finding" that defendant knowingly and intentionally
possessed a controlled substance. State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987). However,
constructive possession may be established through circumstantial evidence. See State v.
Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981).
At trial, the State introduced the following evidence: (1) defendant was the sole
occupant of the backseat of the vehicle; (2) defendant was seen ducking down and reaching
underneath the driver's seat where the methamphetamine was found; (3) a black box
containing drugs and paraphernalia was found open, in plain view, on the passenger side
floorboard of the backseat; (4) defendant was the only one in close proximity to the drugs
and paraphernalia; and (5) the occupants in the front seat of the car were not observed
making any furtive movements. Given this circumstantial evidence against defendant, we
cannot say that the evidence was "'sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime for which he was convicted.'" Salas, 820 P.2d at 1387 (citation omitted).
We conclude that sufficient evidence existed to prove a "nexus between [defendant]
and the drug[s and paraphernalia] to permit an inference that [defendant] had both the power
and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug[s and
paraphernalia]." Layman, 1999 UT 79 at ^[13. Therefore, we affirm defendant's conviction.(1)

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
WE CONCUR:

James Z. Davis, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. Because we affirm defendant's convictions, we do not reach the State's argument under
State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346.

